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INTRODUCTION: STATE REDUCTION OF MUNICIPAL ASSETS

States faced with fiscally distressed municipalities typically must
confront creditor demands for payment, the satisfaction of which
would threaten the provision of local public services. A state that
attempts to strike the delicate balance between assisting its local
governments and maintaining relationships with creditors has
substantial options. The state can, of course, simply provide funding
to municipalities, perhaps conditioned on municipal reforms that
address the problem of moral hazard.1 Alternatively, states may assert

*
Max E. Greenberg Professor of Contract Law, NYU School of Law. Thanks to
participants in the 2020 Fordham Urban Law Journal Cooper-Walsh Colloquium and
especially to David Schleicher for insightful comments.
1. For example, during New York City’s fiscal crisis in the 1970s, New York State
not only provided funding to the city, but also established an emergency financial
control board that imposed a three-year wage freeze on city employees, rejected a
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authority over the municipality either in concert with or in substitution
of municipal officials2 and attempt to negotiate solutions with creditors
or grant creditors priority in municipal revenues.3 The state may also
authorize and encourage the municipality to adjust its debts, primarily
by entering Chapter 9 of the federal Bankruptcy Code. Each of these
efforts may bring some relief to municipal budgets. But they have very
different effects on creditors, and thus on the potential incentives that
future creditors may have to invest in municipalities of the state.
Providing direct relief to the distressed municipalities or dictating
priorities in revenues may permit payment of creditors in full. States
may exercise that option in order to signal future creditors that debts
will be paid. The importance of such signals to maintain the
creditworthiness of municipalities is embodied in provisions such as the
New York State Constitution’s requirement that cities pledge their
faith and credit to debts and exceed real estate tax limits if necessary
to pay those debts.4 Another example is a provision in the General
Laws of Rhode Island that requires cities grant creditors “first liens”
on tax revenues and thus requires payment of debts prior to other
municipal expenses.5
Other jurisdictions have been less solicitous of creditors and have
embraced some form of the third alternative. States that permit their
municipalities to enter bankruptcy essentially signal the possibility that
creditor claims will be adjusted in those proceedings. 6 Current law
prohibits states from enacting their own version of unilaterally

contract that had been negotiated with the transport workers’ union, required the
imposition of tuition at the previously free City University of New York, and modified
the city’s financial plan. See ROBERT W. BAILEY, THE CRISIS REGIME: THE MAC, THE
EFCB, AND THE IMPACT OF THE NEW YORK CITY FINANCIAL CRISIS 64–66, 75–77
(1984); see also SEYMOUR P. LACHMAN & ROBERT POLNER, THE MAN WHO SAVED
NEW YORK 129–37 (2010).
2. See Clayton P. Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Financially
Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1373 (2014).
3. For example, when the City of Central Falls, Rhode Island, faced financial
hardship, the state enacted a statute that gave bond creditors priority over other
creditors, such as pensioners of the city. See 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-12-1 (West
2014).
4. See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; Flushing Nat’l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp.,
358 N.E.2d 848, 850 (N.Y. 1976).
5. See, e.g., 45 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 45-12-1(a).
6. The Bankruptcy Code requires that states specifically authorize their
municipalities to enter federal debt adjustment proceedings. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2).
Only half the states have done so. See Kristen M. DeJong & Beth A. Dougherty,
Municipal Bankruptcy: A Primer on Chapter 9, NUVEEN (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.nuveen.com/en-us/thinking/municipal-bond-investing/municipalbankruptcy-a-primer-on-chapter-9 [https://perma.cc/VN56-7FYU].
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compromising debts of their municipalities. 7 But states may also
attempt to shift the costs of municipal fiscal distress from residents to
creditors by altering the nature of the underlying debt obligation rather
than directly reducing the amount of indebtedness. That may take the
form of shifting assets initially used to support debt to a new set of
creditors. Those efforts were prominent in the late nineteenth century,
as states altered debtor municipalities’ boundaries and taxing authority
on which existing creditors had relied. More recently, states have
attempted to assist distressed municipalities through more subtle
means of shifting assets. 8 Both New York State and Illinois, for
example, have diverted to new state entities tax revenues previously
available to creditors of distressed cities in an effort to generate capital
to which those cities would not otherwise have access, and thus allow
the continuation of municipal services that face reduction or
elimination. 9 The nineteenth-century versions of asset shifting
typically failed on the ramparts of the U.S. Constitution’s Contracts
Clause or similar creditor protections. 10 One might readily dismiss
those nineteenth-century analogues as sufficiently antiquated or born
of different circumstances to reject their applicability to the more
contemporary state interventions on behalf of distressed
municipalities. The effects of the nineteenth-century strategies on
creditors, however, bear enough similarity to recent instances of
redirecting assets that it is useful to determine the implications of those
earlier legal challenges for contemporary forms of municipal finance.
In this Article, I address those similarities and explain why, even if the
early cases remain persuasive authority for the limits of state
intervention, they do not inevitably invalidate the current
interventions.
States that attempt to reduce municipal debt burdens by shifting
assets are not necessarily acting inappropriately, notwithstanding
adverse effects on existing creditors. Bond creditors may be better
positioned than residents to monitor municipal fiscal performance.11
Where that is the case, allocating fiscal risks to those creditors rather
than to residents or other creditors might induce bondholders or their

7. See 11 U.S.C. § 903(1) (“[A] State law prescribing a method of composition of
indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to
such composition . . . .”).
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See Clayton P. Gillette, Bondholders and Financially Stressed Municipalities,
39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 639, 655 (2012).
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representatives to act in a manner consistent with their monitoring
advantage. A state that shifts risks to creditors may therefore be
allocating that risk efficiently. Alternatively, a state might reasonably
conclude that it is more important to maintain municipal services than
to ensure full payment to creditors, and thus seek to reallocate risks ex
post, regardless of which group was better able to monitor budgets ex
ante. The very existence of a municipal bankruptcy regime implies that
there are circumstances in which concerns for municipal fiscal health
prevail over concerns that obligations to creditors will suffer
diminution.
Nevertheless, states that offload risks to creditors may also be acting
strategically, favoring the imposition of current costs on creditors and
long-term costs on future officials and residents who bear the risk that
credit markets will demand higher interest rates from defaulting
localities. State officials who consider themselves accountable to
current residents may have political incentives to engage in that form
of risk-shifting. Those incentives may be enhanced where creditors
comprise non-residents or represent distant capital markets.12 Where
states interfere with creditors’ payments, either by authorizing
municipal bankruptcy or by altering the underlying obligations,
evaluation of the propriety and substance of that intervention may
depend on whether one believes that the state was motivated by the
benign story of efficient allocation of risk and maintenance of
municipal services or the malign story of exploiting creditors.
In this Article, I suggest that the underlying purpose for which the
state diverts assets from cities should determine the legality of the
strategy, notwithstanding the similar effects on creditors that result
from using the strategy for different purposes. The legal implications
may differ if the state diverts assets primarily to exploit non-resident
creditors who have little voice in the decision than if the state adopts
the same strategy to ensure continued delivery of a distressed
municipality’s services. I claim that the nineteenth-century cases
reveal a willingness to sacrifice creditor security even where
unnecessary to maintain the debtor municipality’s fiscal status and that
courts intervened to mitigate such strategic behavior when they
observed it. More contemporary diversions, however, appear to have
been undertaken to ensure that the debtor municipality survives
liquidity crises and can provide the services for which the municipality

12. See CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–1888, at 958–
60 (1971); ERIC H. MONKKONEN, THE LOCAL STATE: PUBLIC MONEY AND AMERICAN
CITIES 9 (1995).
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was created. In effect, the courts appear to demand that the state
balance the need for creditor security against municipal fiscal stability
and tend to permit diversions that facilitate municipal access to need
capital. But the cases neither speak in those terms nor involve much
analysis of how shifting assets will reduce creditor recovery, perhaps
because — in the nineteenth-century cases, at least — the reduction of
creditor security was near total. Thus, the cases appear to reveal
judicial concern for what I refer to as the state’s motive, that is, judicial
suspicion that the state is acting strategically rather than engaging in
the kind of balancing that might justify some increase in creditor risk.
Part I provides a brief discussion of overriding principles that govern
the capacity of states to alter the debts of their political subdivisions.
Part II then discusses several of the major Supreme Court nineteenthcentury decisions that addressed efforts by states to reduce creditor
access to pledged assets of defaulting municipalities. Those efforts
entailed dramatic changes to municipal legal status and geography,
such as shifting municipal boundaries and claiming that reformed
municipalities did not incur the obligations of their predecessors. Most
importantly, Part II discusses not only what states did on behalf of their
distressed localities, but why.
Part III discusses more contemporary versions of asset shifting. It
also explores the difficulties inherent in determining the effects that
even benign efforts to divert revenues have on current creditors. In
particular, Part III discusses the significance of stable market values for
existing securities during and after the period when the state has
created a diversion strategy. Some courts have relied on market values
to conclude that current creditors are unharmed by the diversion of
assets from the debtor.
This Part, however, contends that
consideration of market values at the time of litigation over the
propriety of allegedly impairing legislation cannot predict potential
adverse effects of the diversion strategy in the distant future.
I. STATE RESPONSES TO MUNICIPAL DEBT BURDEN

In the absence of legal constraints, a state could readily shift the risk
of fiscal distress simply by compromising municipal debts, leaving
debtors with unencumbered access to assets previously pledged to the
payment of debt service. In effect, a state could impose its own
municipal bankruptcy regime and adjust its municipalities’ obligations
accordingly. Doing so, however, initially sounds like an obvious
violation of the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution. That
provision prohibits states from enacting any “[l]aw impairing the
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Obligation of Contracts,”13 and a law that permits a debtor to pay less
than is owed seems like the quintessential example of an offending
impairment. Of course, since the Depression-era case of Home
Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,14 courts and commentators have
understood the Contracts Clause as eschewing an absolute prohibition
on state intervention in public or private contracts.15 States may enact
impairing legislation necessary “to protect the . . . general welfare of
the people,” and legislatures have “wide discretion . . . in determining
what is and what is not necessary.” 16 The Clause imposes fewer
constraints on state interference with contractual rights where the
alleged impairment addresses a widespread social problem that would
permit full payment to creditors only at the cost of “safeguard[ing] the
vital interests of its people.” 17 Moreover, nominally impairing
legislation may create no constitutional difficulty where it is
accompanied by compensation or replaces one form of security for the
adversely affected one. 18 Even admitted impairments may pass
constitutional muster where the offending “[l]egislation adjust[s] the
rights and responsibilities of contracting parties . . . upon reasonable
conditions and [possesses] a character appropriate to the public
purpose justifying its adoption.” 19 The state’s capacity to alter its
contractual obligations is weaker, however, where its commitment
does not implicate reserved police powers but is “purely financial.”20
In theory, states may have even more latitude than the constitutional
constraint suggests. Justice Felix Frankfurter’s intellectual gymnastics
in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park,21 a case I revisit
later in this Article, 22 considered the practical implications of an
alleged impairment and thereby created an opportunity for states to
restructure debt where the effect was to increase the expected value of
otherwise uncollectable debts.23 Statutory changes in the Bankruptcy
Code effectively overruled that case by prohibiting states, and it turns

13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
14. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
15. See, e.g., JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE: A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 239–40 (2016).
16. City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508–09 (1965) (quoting E. N.Y. Sav.
Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232–33 (1945)).
17. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 434.
18. See United States Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 19 (1977).
19. Id. at 22.
20. See id. at 25.
21. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
22. See infra notes 155–63 and accompanying text.
23. See Faitoute, 316 U.S. 502.
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out, Puerto Rico, from imposing a composition of indebtedness.24 But
if the state-imposed solution approved in Faitoute increases the value
of creditors’ holdings, then perhaps the proper argument — suggested
initially by Michael McConnell and Randal Picker25 — is to repeal the
statutory proscription. 26 Moreover, there is a significant argument,
accepted by federal courts in the Southern District of New York27 and
the District of Puerto Rico,28 that distinguishes between a permissible
extension of the time for payment and a prohibited composition of
indebtedness.
Historically, however, states have been more creative in reducing
creditors’ access to municipal assets than simply extending the maturity
of the debt in question. In the nineteenth century, state intervention
took blatant forms of dissolving indebted municipalities or merging
them into other municipalities that claimed no obligation to pay the
merged jurisdiction’s creditors. 29 As the next Part recounts, those
strategies rarely succeeded, defeated by a series of Supreme Court
cases that were instrumental in defining the scope of the Contracts
Clause during the pre-Blaisdell era. But their antiquity does not entail
their irrelevance. In a period in which states have discovered more
nuanced mechanisms for stripping a discrete set of revenues previously
available to creditors, attention to those earlier cases reveals whether
the situations are easily distinguishable or whether the same impulses
that motivated the obvious diminution of contractual security infect the
more nuanced ones.

24. See 11 U.S.C. § 903. For application of the prohibition, see Puerto Rico v.
Franklin California Tax-Free Trust, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1938 (2016).
25. See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
Conceptual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 479–80

(1993).
26. Given the presence of Chapter 9, a repeal of the statutory proscription would
make sense only if state bankruptcy regimes generated benefits not attainable through
the federal bankruptcy process and imposed no offsetting costs. One potential benefit
would be that states could address structural and governance defects that contribute to
municipal fiscal distress in ways not easily achieved through federal law. See generally
Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role
in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150 (2016).
27. See Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York, 425 F. Supp. 970, 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
28. See Assured Guar. Corp. v. Garcia-Padilla, 214 F. Supp. 3d 117, 126 (D.P.R.
2016).
29. See infra Part II.
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II. THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY DISSOLUTION CASES
A. Railing Against Debt: State Reactions to Municipal Defaults

The story begins in the mid- to late-nineteenth century when
municipalities first engaged in debt financing, largely to support
promoters of railroad lines or similar infrastructure.30 Debts incurred
for these purposes took the form of what is referred to today as a
general obligation bond, payable from the general taxes of the issuer
rather than solely from the revenues generated by the railroads that
benefitted from the bond proceeds.31 Thus, bondholders anticipated
payment regardless of the success of the enterprise their bonds
financed. Nevertheless, these debts were presumed to be relatively
burden-free for residents, as the financed facilities would generate
economic development and the corresponding tax revenues necessary
to pay bondholders.32
Commentators such as John Dillon feared the fiscal mischief that
long-term debt would impose on municipalities induced by the promise
of painless repayment and a belief that any risk would fall on
subsequent generations: “[T]he stimulus which the long credit
commonly provided for effectually supplies, to over-indebtedness.”33
Indeed, many localities soon discovered that the presumed economic
benefits would not materialize — not every municipality could become
a major crossroads in the national market that railroads promised to
create.34 Defaults on debt followed, motivated either by the failure of
promoters to construct the promised railroad; the financial failure of a
constructed railroad; general fiscal distress of the borrowing locality,
exacerbated by the railroad aid debt; or simple reluctance to pay debts

30. See ALBERT MILLER HILLHOUSE, MUNICIPAL BONDS: A CENTURY OF
EXPERIENCE 143–99 (1936); ALBERTA M. SBRAGIA, DEBT WISH 58–60 (1996).
31. See L. A. Powe, Jr., Rehearsal for Substantive Due Process: The Municipal
Bond Cases, 53 TEX. L. REV. 738, 739–40 (1975).
32. See SBRAGIA, supra note 30, at 55–57.
33. JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 5 (1876). Dillon suggested
that municipalities seeking railroads and similar internal improvements systematically
incurred unaffordable debt:
The writer has known new counties in a western state, not containing over
10,000 inhabitants, vote, for a single railway, bonds to the amount of $300,000,
drawing ten per cent interest, payable annually, and instances are not
infrequent where bonds have been issued greater than the assessed value of
all the taxable property at the time, within the municipal or territorial subdivision.

Id.

34. See Powe, Jr., supra note 31, at 739.
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— sometimes justified by accusations of bribery or fraud. 35 Eric
Monkkonen concluded that in late nineteenth-century Illinois,
taxpayers “tried to avoid paying their debts if they thought they could
get away with it,”36 and that decisions to default were often “political,
not fiscal,”37 though he more generously argued that some defaulting
localities were retaliating against railroad firms that failed to live up to
their contractual obligations.38
Confronted with localities either unwilling or unable to pay their
debts, states could either support creditors in their claims against their
borrowers or assist the recalcitrant localities. One might have thought
that states would take the former route to avoid any contagion that
might otherwise flow from the reluctance of capital markets to extend
credit to the state or its other political subdivisions. However, states —
perhaps motivated by the New York’s domination of capital
markets 39 –– frequently opted to enjoy short-term political benefits
and intervened to frustrate creditors’ remedies. As Dillon put it,
“[o]ccasionally it has been witnessed that the state, in all its
departments, has actively sympathized with the repudiating
municipality, and the public faith has been redeemed only through the
coercion of the Supreme Court of the United States.”40
But one need not attribute purely strategic motives to states that
desired to assist their localities at the expense of distant creditors.
Localities had a reasonable expectation that technological advances
were a condition of economic development, and that support of those
technologies — canals, railroads, communication facilities — would
attract commercial entities and generate tax revenues essential to
economic success.41 In the nineteenth century, no less than today, local
governments sponsored technological development by facilitating the
networks that generate agglomeration benefits.42 They did so by doing

35. See id. at 740; see also SBRAGIA, supra note 30, at 58–60. For plausibly
fraudulent practices by railroad promoters to secure the assent of municipalities to the
issuance of bonds, see for example FAIRMAN, supra note 12, at 958–60; HILLHOUSE,
supra note 30, at 152; MONKKONEN, supra note 12, at 76.
36. MONKKONEN, supra note 12, at 69.
37. Id. at 76.
38. See id.
39. See Allison R. Buccola & Vincent S.J. Buccola, The Municipal Bond Cases
Revisited, 95 AM. BANKR. L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 11–12).
40. DILLON, supra note 33, at 6.
41. See SBRAGIA, supra note 30, at 44–47.
42. See generally OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A
STUDY OF THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY:
MASSACHUSETTS, 1774–1861 (rev. ed. 1987).
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what cities seeking economic growth have historically done: support or
create the infrastructure necessary to allow the provision of those
benefits, such as transportation terminals, or provide the amenities
(police services, roads, sanitation) uniquely specific to urban life.43 A
city that failed to adopt novel technologies that would allow it to
connect to other cities within a developing national economy was
unlikely to grow or even to survive.44 Notwithstanding the reservations
that Dillon expressed, incurring debt was a rational mechanism to
attract economic opportunities, since the necessary technologies were
sufficiently capital intensive that government units could more readily
provide the necessary infusions than nascent capital markets could.45
Even in an era characterized by limited municipal authority, states
granted their localities explicit permission to aid railroads, and
municipalities, induced by over-optimism or perhaps a fear of being
left behind in the race for metropolitan growth, unhesitatingly entered
the competition.46
Once those capital investments were made, however, they created a
risk that if the anticipated economic benefits failed to materialize, the
outstanding debt would cause the debtor municipality to suffer
economic and population shrinkage rather than expansion. Failure of
large numbers of railroads was inevitable given the number of fledgling
companies that sought to dominate the transportation of goods and
people.47 The intense competition among rivalrous cities to become
major hubs of transportation and economic activity, however, also
meant that railroad failures would cause municipal failures.48 Those
failures, in turn, required states to confront both political and economic
pressures to shift the subsequent losses to creditors who had purchased
the railroad aid bonds now in default.49
While the political incentives to favor residents over non-resident
creditors are readily comprehensible, the economic incentives are
more complicated. One might believe that states would resist the
political pressure to shift losses to avoid the risk that capital markets
would punish a defaulting jurisdiction within the state, and that the
default of one municipality would tinge the credit of other jurisdictions

See PAUL BAIROCH, CITIES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 151–52 (1988).
See SBRAGIA, supra note 30, at 44–50.
See id.
See, e.g., DILLON, supra note 33, at 16; HILLHOUSE, supra note 30, at 153; Powe,
Jr., supra note 31, at 739.
47. See FAIRMAN, supra note 12, at 934; HILLHOUSE, supra note 30, at 149–53.
48. See SBRAGIA, supra note 30, 58–60.
49. See id.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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within the state. That economic reality applied regardless of whether
defaulting municipalities claimed inability to pay or reluctance to pay
predicated on fraud or failure of consideration. Bond purchasers had
extended credit based on the promise to pay, and they expected
payment.
But the states’ motives to intervene may also have reflected
recognition of the relationship between debt relief and municipal
success. Municipalities attract tax base and investment by providing
services that potential and actual residents value no less than the tax
price they must pay to receive them.50 In short, mobile residents and
capital will migrate to municipalities that provide services from which
residents and capital receive net benefits. That objective cannot be
satisfied when there is significant debt overhang, that is, when
substantial revenues of the municipality are dedicated to past services
or to debt payments from which current payers receive no benefit.51
Under those conditions, potential investors in a locality are likely to
forgo investment, and mobile capital already situated within the
municipality is likely to exit to jurisdictions more capable of providing
benefits consistent with residents’ financial burdens. The consequence
of debt overhang is a downward spiral of the local economy as fewer
fiscally capable taxpayers must support a continuing stream of debt
payments leading to a cycle of additional disinvestment and exit.52
That result was exactly what nineteenth-century municipal debtors
experienced — loss of population, political will to pay debts, and
capacity to pay even those debts that the population recognized as
legitimate.53 State intervention to reduce debt burden by encouraging
default and rescuing those localities that took that route, therefore, was
not necessarily a political imperative born of a desire to externalize
costs. It was equally an economic decision predicated on a desire to
maintain economic growth in an era that preceded a federal
bankruptcy regime that could facilitate the same result.

50. See, e.g., Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial
Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 658–59 (2008). This result is implicit in the Tiebout

hypothesis, which predicts that under a series of strong assumptions, in-migration and
out-migration will generate an efficient level of municipal services. See Charles M.
Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 65 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
51. See, e.g., Vincent Buccola, The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law,
86 U. CHI. L. REV. 817, 845 (2019).
52. See Clayton P. Gillette, How Cities Fail: Service Delivery Insolvency and
Municipal Bankruptcy, MICH. ST. L. REV. 1211, 1213–14 (2019).
53. See SBRAGIA, supra note 30, at 61.
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The form of state intervention varied. There are well-told stories54
of courts providing relief to indebted municipalities by invalidating
bonds allegedly issued without sufficient legal authority or compliance
with legal prerequisites,55 or concluding that railroad aid constituted an
impermissible private purpose. 56 My concern, however, involves a
strategy other than questioning the validity of the bonds. Given the
nature of the obligation that the defaulted bonds represented —
general obligation bonds payable from the revenues and property of
the debtor municipality — creditors’ remedies against defaulting
municipalities consisted primarily of efforts to seize municipal taxes or
other municipal property. Sympathetic states diluted the value of that
remedy by the rather direct device of altering the identity of the
indebted municipality. This process consisted of measures such as
redrawing the defaulting municipality’s boundaries or, in more radical
cases, abolishing it altogether, allegedly leaving creditors of the issuer
without recourse remedy since the nominal debtor municipality no
longer existed. I refer to these strategies collectively as involving
“dissolution” of the indebted municipality.
Initially, the strategy of dissolution had some success in providing
relief to distressed municipalities. In 1879, the Tennessee legislature
repealed the charter of the City of Memphis.57 The city had been in
perilous financial condition, partially a consequence of yellow fever
outbreaks, and partially a function of mismanagement and failure to
collect 40% of levied taxes, some of which were required to pay bonds
to support railroad construction and other infrastructure
improvements. 58 When creditors brought actions for writs of
mandamus to have outstanding taxes collected and paid to them, the
state withdrew the city’s taxing authority, assumed control of the city’s
property, 59 created a taxing district to administer taxes that were

54. See e.g., FAIRMAN, supra note 12; HILLHOUSE, supra note 30; Powe, Jr., supra
note 31; David Schleicher, Hands On! Part I: The Trilemma Facing the Federal
Government During State and Local Budget Crises (Yale L. Sch., Pub. L. & Legal
Theory
Rsch.
Paper
Series,
2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3649278
[https://perma.cc/5DCC-R6KA].
55. See Clarke v. Town of Northampton, 120 F. 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1903); see also
Winona & St. Peter R.R. v. Plainview, 143 U.S. 371, 393 (1892).
56. See, e.g., People ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. Co. v. Twp. Bd. of Salem, 20
Mich. 452, 453 (1870); Stokes v. Cnty. of Scott, 10 Iowa 166, 171 (1859).
57. See Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 503–04 (1880) (Field, J., concurring).
58. See id. at 502–03.
59. The transferred property included “public buildings, squares, promenades,
wharves, streets, alleys, parks, fire-engines, hose and carriages, engine-houses,
engineer instruments, and all other property, real and personal, previously used for
municipal purposes.” Id. at 504.
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imposed directly by the legislature on the geographic area previously
defined as the city, and provided a procedure by which the Governor
would appoint a receiver for the municipality to collect outstanding
taxes and seek to compromise the outstanding debt.60 The legislation
also exempted taxes due or moneys of the county trustee from legal
process, prohibited the issuance of any writ of mandamus or other
processes from compelling the collection of taxes, and proscribed the
use of taxes imposed by the state to pay debts of the dissolved
municipalities. 61 In short, the legislature upended the traditional
remedies used by municipal creditors to obtain and execute judgments
against defaulting debtors. But the legislature also required that predissolution taxes owed to the city be collected by the state-appointed
receiver and dedicated to the payment of its debts, a tactic that Justice
Stephen J. Field believed to be a demonstration that the legislature was
not trying to exempt the city from its “just liabilities.”62
Not surprisingly, creditors of Memphis initiated an action to collect
on their debts and invalidate the state legislation. The federal court in
that suit appointed its own receiver to take possession of the city’s
assets.63 Thus, there were two competing receivers, one appointed by
the Governor and one appointed by the court, each charged with
overlapping duties of collecting property and dealing with Memphis
creditors. That conflict generated the inevitable dispute that ended
with the Supreme Court’s complicated and ambiguous decision in
Meriwether v. Garrett.64
The opinion for the Court consisted of a brief statement of the
Court’s conclusions, but was devoid of any rationale. Those
conclusions simply addressed the issue of which assets were available
to municipal creditors after the state’s intervention; there was no
explicit determination concerning the legitimacy of that intervention.65
The Court defined the assets available to creditors restrictively.
Creditors, the Court concluded, did not have access to physical
property held in trust for the public or private property of individuals
within the city’s limits.66 Nor could creditors reach taxes previously
levied but not collected, unless the legislature explicitly so

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 504–05.
See id. at 505.
See id. at 511.
See id. at 507–08.
See id. at 508.
See id. at 501–02 (opinion of the Court).
See id. at 501.
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authorized.67 The state-appointed receiver could, pursuant to statute,
collect taxes that had been levied prior to dissolution, but those funds
could only be used for the purposes for which they were raised.68 The
implication was that the legislation had effectively barred Memphis
creditors from any recourse against taxes imposed through the statecreated taxing district and not explicitly allocated to the payment of
Memphis debts. That the taxing district now encompassed the
population, geography, and economy of Memphis was legally
irrelevant.
In an opinion joined by three other Justices, Justice Field provided
his reasoning behind the Court’s otherwise unembellished conclusions.
Perhaps most importantly, Justice Field concluded that municipal
property that had been available to pay debts prior to dissolution
would remain available to creditors after dissolution. 69 But taxes
previously levied, though uncollected at the time of dissolution, did not
qualify as such property. Uncollected taxes imposed for the support of
government — “ordinary taxes” — were not property of the
municipality that could be seized for debts.70 “They are only the means
provided for obtaining funds to support its government and pay its
debts, and disappear as such means with the revocation of the charter,
except as the legislature may otherwise provide.”71 Hence, the lower
court could not have ordered its receiver to collect them. While
mandamus might lie to compel an officer of the municipality to collect
outstanding debts, once the office of collection was abolished, “there is
nothing upon which the courts can act.”72 Only the legislature could
levy taxes and hence prescribe the means by which they are collected.73
Courts, certainly federal courts, might have been able to compel the
collection of currently authorized taxes. But they had no authority to
continue taxing powers that had been removed by the legislature or
create new taxing authority.74 Creditors could seize the anomalously
designated “private property” of the municipality or proceed by
mandamus to require the state-appointed receiver to collect such taxes
as the state permitted. 75 Beyond that, unpaid creditors could only
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See id.
See id. at 501–02.
See id. at 512 (Field, J., concurring).
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Id. at 515.
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supplicate to the legislature, 76 which had, of course, already
demonstrated a lack of sympathy for their plight.
Although the majority of the Court did not directly address whether
dissolution of the debtor municipality without providing for payment
of its debts unconstitutionally impaired the obligation of contract,
Justice Field’s concurrence implied that repeal of a tax “so connected
with a contract, as the inducement for its execution” would constitute
such a violation.77 But the debts at issue in Meriwether did not involve
any specific taxes designated for payment to bondholders. They were
secured solely by “ordinary taxes authorized for the support of
government” that constituted “only the means provided for obtaining
funds to support its government and pay its debts.”78 The power to
collect those taxes and use the proceeds to pay debts dissolved when
the municipality did, unless the legislature provided otherwise.79 The
negative implication of that statement was that the dissolution of
Memphis did not impair an obligation of contract because no
commitment of particular taxes had formed part of the contract with
bondholders. Certainly, in Justice Field’s view, federal courts had
limited capacity to interfere with state procedures that restrained the
collection of debts or to designate as property of the municipality those
assets that the legislature had excluded.
Justice Field further concluded that those who enter into contracts
with municipalities do so with full knowledge that the legislature can
alter them or their powers.80 That remark, standing as a statement of
the relationship between states and their political subdivisions, seems
uncontroversial. But if Justice Field meant that knowledge of state
authority over its political subdivisions deprived creditors of all
remedies if the state withdrew municipal assets subsequent to the time
credit was extended, his conclusion would deprive the Contracts
Clause of all meaning. A valid law in effect at the time that bonds are
issued certainly becomes incorporated into the bond contract. Thus, if
state law validly permitted subsequent modifications of the contract,
state imposition of such a modification would not create an
impairment.81 The state’s ability subsequently to modify the contract
was part of the original bargain. But to transform that proposition into
one that embodies a general legislative power unilaterally to impose
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See id. at 515.
Id. at 514.
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See e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
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any post-issuance modification of municipal revenue raising authority
would eliminate any vestige of the capacity of one legislature to bind
another. Perhaps that explains Justice William Strong’s dissenting
remark that “[i]f ever legislation impaired the obligation of contracts,
this did.”82
The Court’s failure to address the issue of impairment directly
caused at least some to conclude that dissolution combined with
deprivation of all taxing power to pay outstanding debts was
constitutionally permissible. Indeed, John Dillon, probably the major
authority on municipal finance at the time, interpreted Meriwether
that way and concluded that if the state dissolved a debtor municipality
and failed either to provide for the payment of its debts or to create a
successor with taxing authority payable for debt service, then the courts
are “practically powerless” to provide creditors with a remedy.83
Other states avoided the receivership route but attempted to deprive
creditors of municipal assets by merging the indebted locality into
other entities that claimed no responsibility for the debts of the premerger municipalities. That strategy proved less successful in the
federal courts. For example, the town of Racine, Wisconsin, fell victim
to the railroad bond craze and subscribed for $50,000 worth of railroad
stock in 1853.84 The city paid for the stock with the proceeds of bonds
issued with a 20-year term. 85 With what can only be described as
perfect foresight or perfect irony, the state legislature in 1860 renamed
Racine as Orwell.86 The legislature subsequently dissolved the town
and annexed its property in parts to other existing towns. 87 Those
towns maintained that, since Orwell had disappeared, they had no
authority to impose taxes necessary to pay its debts.88
One might have thought that disestablishment of a town was the
ultimate means of denying creditors access to its taxing authority or
property, so that reallocation of Orwell’s assets to other towns fell
within the doctrines established by Meriwether. But the Supreme
Court had a different response than it did in the Memphis case. In
Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, the Court concluded that,

82. Meriwether, 102 U.S. at 532 (Strong, J., dissenting).
83. See Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., The Rights of Creditors of a Municipal
Corporation When the State Has Passed a Law to Abolish or Alter It, 12 VA. L. REG.
175, 181–82 (1906).
84. See Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514, 520 (1879).
85. See id. at 514–15.
86. See id. at 515.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 523–24.
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if the extinguished municipality owes outstanding debts, it will be
presumed in every such case that the legislature intended that the
liabilities as well as the rights of property of the corporation which
thereby ceases to exist shall accompany the territory and property
into the jurisdiction to which the territory is annexed.89

The legislature’s failure to make a provision for the payment of debts
of the extinguished municipality necessarily impaired the obligation of
contract.90 That proposition, however, would seem, as a logical matter,
to apply as readily to the Tennessee law that transformed Memphis
into a taxing district as it did to the carving up of Orwell.
Some states simply extinguished municipalities and replaced them
with new municipalities. The poster child for this strategy was the
Alabama legislature.91 In 1859, the legislature authorized the City of
Mobile to issue bonds to finance the Mobile & Great Northern
Railroad Company. 92 The city defaulted on the bonds in 1878, and
bondholders sought a writ of mandamus for collection of taxes
sufficient to pay the debt.93 The Alabama legislature cagily responded
with a law that abolished the City of Mobile and ordered its property
to be sold to pay the debts of the dissolved city.94 That response was
not, however, necessarily an effort to ensure the availability of
sufficient assets to satisfy bondholders in full, or even to pay its “just
liabilities” to the extent possible. Instead, as in the case of the
Tennessee legislation contested in Meriwether and as was common in
other efforts to resolve default litigation,95 the ostensible intent of the
Alabama legislature was to force creditors to compromise the
municipality’s debts. The law that required the sale of city property
provided for the appointment of commissioners to sell the municipal
property and “to treat with the holders of the funded debt of the city
of Mobile with a view to its adjustment and settlement.”96 But the law
also prohibited the commissioners from imposing new taxes to pay the
delinquency that would inevitably arise, given the limited assets
available for sale and the priority that other debts had over the railroad
bonds. 97 The legislature then incorporated a new municipality,
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designated as Port of Mobile, that comprised about 94% of the taxable
property and about 93% of the residents of the former City of Mobile.98
The omitted property consisted “largely of fields, swamps and land
covered with water.” 99 But the incorporating legislation essentially
prohibited those who governed the Port from levying any taxes to pay
the former city’s debts.
The Supreme Court saw right through the ruse. The Court
concluded that, as in the case of merged municipalities, the Port of
Mobile was the legal successor to the City of Mobile and hence liable
for its debts:
Where the resource for the payment of the bonds of a municipal
corporation is the power of taxation existing when the bonds were
issued, any law which withdraws or limits the taxing power and leaves
no adequate means for the payment of the bonds is forbidden by the
Constitution of the United States, and is null and void.100

While the Court did not invoke the Contracts Clause by name, and
some have therefore concluded that the Court never explained the
legal basis for its decision, 101 it seems clear that Court had the
Contracts Clause in its sights. The rationale it provided for the decision
is textbook Contracts Clause jurisprudence: “[T]he remedies for the
enforcement of such obligations assumed by a municipal corporation,
which existed when the contract was made, must be left unimpaired by
the legislature, or, if they are changed, a substantial equivalent must be
provided.”102 What may have been implicit, though unspoken, in the
Court’s decision was a rejection of the drastic nature of the state’s
action. There was little doubt that the city suffered distress sufficient
to warrant “adjustment and settlement” of Mobile’s debt. 103 But
perhaps the Court was suspicious that the best way to force an
equitable compromise was to disestablish the city and purport to revive
it without any consideration to creditors’ claims for repayment.
Other courts were similarly less attentive to the niceties of existing
Contracts Clause doctrine to constrain states that had transparently

98. See id. at 291. The Alabama legislature appears to have had a penchant for
dissolving a city and then reincorporating it under a similar name. See e.g., Amy & Co.
v. Selma, 77 Ala. 103 (1884).
99. Port of Mobile, 116 U.S. at 304.
100. Id. at 305.
101. See Aurelia Chaudhury, Adam J. Levitin & David Schleicher, Junk Cities:
Resolving Insolvency Crises in Overlapping Municipalities, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 459,
525 n.271 (2019).
102. Port of Mobile, 116 U.S. at 305.
103. See id. at 293.
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denied creditors access to property that initially served as security for
their debts. After the failure of Jay Cooke & Company, the largest
employer in the City of Duluth, the city’s population declined from
5,000 to 1,500 within a year, and tax delinquencies increased
significantly. 104 With the city deeply in debt and little means of
satisfying bondholders, the legislature adopted the strategy from the
Alabama playbook. The Minnesota legislature carved the Village of
Duluth out of the City of Duluth, included within the village virtually
all of the population and taxable property of the city, denied the city’s
ability either to have access to taxes raised by the village or to create a
means of allowing bondholders suits against the city, but permitted city
bondholders to exchange their bonds for village bonds in an amount of
one-fourth of the surrendered city bonds. 105 In an opinion that
overruled the city and village’s demurrer to the complaint, the court
concluded that the facts admitted by the defendants permitted
creditors to follow the assets of the city into the village. 106 The
legislature was entitled to create the village out of the territory of the
city and to apportion the existing indebtedness between them; it was
not entitled to extract population and taxable property in a manner
that denied existing creditors of any reasonable capacity to obtain
payment of the debt.107
The obligations of a municipal corporation are not affected, although
the name may be changed and the territory increased or diminished,
if the new organization embraces substantially the same territory and
the same inhabitants. It may be true that generally creditors, to obtain
relief, must look exclusively to the corporation creating the debt; but
when a state of facts exists as disclosed here, and the old corporation
is diminished in population, wealth, and territory to the extent
admitted, it would be a mockery of justice to withhold the relief
asked.108

Not only did the court fail to invoke the language of the Contracts
Clause, but also it explicitly deferred the issue of whether the statute
impaired the obligation of contracts. Instead, it relied on equitable
principles to require the defendants at least to answer the plaintiff’s
claim for recovery on his bonds.109
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Other dissolution strategies to limit creditor recoveries left existing
boundaries intact but reduced municipal revenue-raising capacity
below what prior bondholders would have anticipated at the time they
extended credit. These cases provide precursors to contemporary
cases of asset shifting. Where municipal revenues are insufficient to
pay both creditors and providers of current services, municipal
residents presumably would prefer to have their tax payments
dedicated to the latter since the benefits to be realized from the former
have already been received. If payments for current services have
priority, municipal residents might wish to restrict municipalities’
capacity to generate revenues sufficient to pay debts. States facilitated
such strategies by withdrawing taxing power from indebted localities,
perhaps leaving enough resources to fund essential services while
denying payments to creditors. The City of Quincy, Illinois, for
example, received legislative approval to purchase railroad stock, pay
for the purchase through bond issuance, and impose a special tax
sufficient to pay interest on the bonds.110 Quincy failed to impose the
special tax or to pay debt service. 111 But in refusing to pay
bondholders, the city also relied on a tax limitation that the legislature
enacted subsequent to issuance of the bonds.112 The city contended
that tax revenues within that limit would be insufficient to pay both the
expenses of the city and a judgment on the defaulted bonds.113 Here,
too, the Supreme Court intervened to protect creditors by invalidating
post-issuance state reductions of local assets — here, taxing capacity —
to pay debts. In Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, the Court concluded
that the original statute that authorized issuance of the bonds and
provided payment through the special tax constituted a contract with
bondholders.114 Subsequent repeal of that taxing authority sufficiently
impaired the obligation of that contract as to be “a nullity.”115
One might have thought that the existence of the special tax in Von
Hoffman would serve as a sufficient basis for distinguishing the case
from Meriwether in evaluating state reductions of municipal assets.
After all, Justice Field had drawn a distinction between special taxes
and ordinary taxes when he found that creditors had no right to the
latter in the Memphis case.116 But that was not the route the Court
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adopted in Von Hoffman or thereafter. Wolff v. City of New
Orleans117 also involved the effects of a post-issuance tax limitation.
New Orleans had issued railroad aid bonds but imposed no special tax
to pay them. 118 After default, the city contended that it held no
unappropriated funds that could be used for the bonds and that a
statute limiting the amount of taxes that could be imposed prohibited
taxation sufficient to pay the outstanding debt.119 As in Von Hoffman,
the assumption in Wolff appears to have been that funds appropriated
to provide essential municipal services took priority over bondholder
claims.120 A strict reading of Meriwether might suggest that the court
could impose no remedy because the legislature had defined the scope
of taxation, and federal courts could not exceed it. A strict reading of
Von Hoffman might suggest that post-issuance, state-imposed
constraints on taxation were not valid against bondholders who
anticipated use of the taxing power to pay debt service. But Justice
Field chose not to choose among precedents. Instead, he distinguished
the cases. For him, the decision in Meriwether was justified by the
absence of any municipal incorporation that could impose the taxes
necessary to pay bondholders:
The city with all her officers having thus gone out of existence, there
was no organization left — no machinery — upon which the courts
could act by mandamus for the enforcement of her obligations to
creditors. The question considered, therefore, was whether the taxes
levied before the repeal of the charter, but not paid, were assets which
the court could collect through a receiver and apply upon judgments
against the city.121

The Louisiana legislature, however, had left the New Orleans
government intact. Hence, the Court could require the assessment and
collection of taxes by the very officers who had created the obligations
on which the bondholders had received a judgment.122 In an expansive
reading of Von Hoffman that made the existence of a special tax
irrelevant, Justice Field interpreted that case as broadly invalidating
limits on the taxing power that the city had possessed when the
contested bonds were issued.123
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That seems like a little too much hair splitting. Certainly, from the
creditors’ perspective, whether the debtor municipality was merged
into another municipality as in Town of Mt. Pleasant or the
municipality retained its identity but had limited taxing authority as in
Wolff, or municipal functions were placed under the jurisdiction of a
different entity such as the state receiver in Meriwether, seems
irrelevant to the availability of pledged taxes.124 Justice John Marshall
Harlan perhaps agreed. His concurrence with the majority opinion in
Wolff made clear his dissatisfaction with Justice Field’s discussion of
Meriwether: “Nor do I wish to be understood as assenting to the
correctness of the statement in the opinion as to what was involved and
decided in Meriwether v. Garrett.”125
The Court’s broad reading of Von Hoffman in Wolff also appears
problematic. Read as a prohibition of post-issuance tax reductions
without regard to the consequences for debt satisfaction, the holding in
Wolff would bar virtually any municipal or state restructuring of city
taxing arrangments in place at the time bonds were issued —
reformation of property taxes to equalize spending among school
districts, granting property tax relief to lower-income property owners,
tax abatements to attract residents and tax base, etc. — because all such
efforts arguably “render[] less efficacious” the means of enforcing
bonds by reducing assets available to creditors.126 Such an absolutist
view of the Contracts Clause may not survive post-Blaisdell
jurisprudence. But that does not mean that pre-Blaisdell cases are
irrelevant. Instead it requires a more careful distillation of what
motivated the strong holdings in those cases to see whether similar
circumstances characterize the more contemporary efforts to divert
municipal assets. Unless those circumstances are distinguishable, the
similar effects of current municipal asset diversion may generate
similar legal results, even if the test for state intervention has become
less absolute. I next turn to those issues.
B. Holdouts or Holdups? Motive and Dissolution

The doctrinal distinctions and inconsistencies in these cases suggest
that something more complicated than variations on state strategies for
withdrawing municipal assets from creditors’ reach was at stake.
Perhaps the Court was attempting to work out an appropriate balance
between creditor rights and the need to grant states some latitude in

124. See Flournoy, Jr., supra note 83, at 189.
125. Wolff, 103 U.S. at 369 (Harlan, J., concurring).
126. See id. at 367 (majority opinion).
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allowing their localities to escape fiscal distress. That balance could
change over time or from case to case, depending, perhaps, on what the
courts viewed as the underlying motivation for the legislative diversion
of municipal assets. Perhaps the Court was attempting to distinguish
between cases in which solvent municipalities were exhibiting a
reluctance to pay and cases in which payment was either impossible127
or, given the fraudulent underpinnings of the contested debt,
inequitable. 128 Perhaps the Court, after demonstrating initial
compassion for municipalities that received nothing in return for
incurring crushing obligations, ultimately decided that permitting
states too much latitude to alter creditors’ bargains would restrict
credit markets at a time when infrastructure finance depended on
municipal access to capital. Even in Meriwether, Justice Field decried
repudiation of debts. In suggesting that creditors could find a
sympathetic voice in state legislatures that might yet authorize tax
collections that federal judges could not, Justice Field reminded all
listeners:
It is certainly of the highest importance to the people of every State
that it should make provision, not merely for the payment of its own
indebtedness, but for the payment of the indebtedness of its different
municipalities. Hesitation to do this is weakness; refusal to do it is
dishonor. Infidelity to engagements causes loss of character to the
individual; it entails reproach upon the State.129

Others have similarly suggested that in the several hundred
decisions concerning municipal bonds in the late nineteenth century,
federal courts generally, and the Supreme Court in particular, were
motivated largely by a desire to serve the interests of capital.130 That
instrumental thesis may be less compelling than it appears from
consideration of the consequences of the decisions, which certainly
would have buoyed capital markets. Allison Buccola and Vincent
Buccola have recently demonstrated that the Supreme Court decisions
were more law-bound than the pro-capital thesis can bear, and that
courts frequently decided at least those cases involving the validity of
the bonds in a manner that reflected optimal risk allocation rather than

127. See, e.g., HILLHOUSE, supra note 30, at 155, 175 (describing the relationship
between antipathy towards payments and inability to pay).
128. For accounts of bonds, the proceeds of which were not properly spent, see id.
at 152, 184. See also MONKKONEN, supra note 12.
129. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 520 (1880) (Field, J., concurring).
130. See FAIRMAN, supra note 12; HILLHOUSE, supra note 30; Buccola & Buccola,
supra note 39 (manuscript at 5–6).
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blind subservience to the interests of capital. 131 The validity cases,
however, were not the only ones that involved the allocation of risk.
The dissolution cases similarly addressed allocation of the risk that the
project to be funded with bond proceeds — typically railroads — would
prove as commercially rewarding as anticipated.132 Where that did not
happen, either because the railroad did not get constructed at all or
because it ultimately failed, debtor municipalities that sought to escape
payments essentially argued that bondholders, not they, bore the risk
of project failure. Municipalities did not necessarily claim that they
had no assets to pay bondholders; rather, as cases like Von Hoffman
and Wolff indicate, it was common for municipalities to claim that
municipal assets must first be used to maintain municipal services and
that bondholders had to bear the risk of project failure if insufficient
funds remained to pay debts. 133 State intervention that reduced
municipal assets and thus contributed to the shortfall was simply
consistent with the understood risk allocation. For creditors, of course,
that same intervention was simply strategic offloading of a risk that
bondholders had paid to impose on the municipality.
But a close reading of the dissolution cases reveals an alternative or
different motivation that complicates the issue of whether states were
benignly attempting to rescue distressed localities or malignly
attempting to exploit investors. The dissolving state legislation at stake
in some of the cases recited that funds could be used to compromise
debts and sometimes even to set the reservation price in any
negotiation. Recall, for example, the legislative requirement in the
City of Mobile dissolution that required the city “to treat with the
holders of the funded debt of the city of Mobile with a view to its
adjustment and settlement.” 134 Similarly, the Tennessee legislation
challenged in Meriwether created a commission “to settle and
compromise the indebtedness of said municipal corporation, by
funding the same, at a rate not exceeding fifty-five cents in the dollar
on judgments, and not exceeding fifty cents in the dollar for bonds or
coupons past due.”135
In effect, in an era without a federal municipal bankruptcy law,
legislative proposals of a “final offer” may have been the functional
equivalent of the current requirement that a municipality negotiate in

131. See Buccola & Buccola, supra note 39.
132. See supra Section II.A.
133. See e.g., Wolff v. City of New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1880); Von Hoffman v.
City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535 (1866).
134. Port of Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289, 293 (1886).
135. Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472, 475 (1880).
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good faith with creditors as a prerequisite to entering Chapter 9. 136
What is less clear is whether these efforts at settlement were, in fact,
motivated by good faith and by actual constraints on the debtor’s
ability to pay, or whether they reflected a strategic desire to drive
creditors to the bargaining table and to impose a settlement that
required a lesser contribution from the debtor than might be required
by a “good faith” standard. As Albert Miller Hillhouse recounted,
“[m]uch of the resistance and defensive litigation on the part of the
debtor localities was designed solely to wear out the creditors and drive
them eventually, in desperation, to a compromise favorable to the
repudiators.” 137 Notwithstanding expressions of sympathy for
residents faced with devastating financial burdens incurred for projects
that never reached their potential, Monkkonen concluded, “taxpayers
in the late nineteenth century tried to avoid paying their debts if they
thought they could get away with it.”138
These sentiments suggest a degree of creditor powerlessness that
seems inconsistent with the traditional understanding of municipal
creditors. In the absence of federal bankruptcy proceedings to
overcome the Contracts Clause’s constraints, the general problem for
compromising municipal debts had historically been the presence of
holdout creditors.139 Constitutional restrictions on the state’s ability to
impair contracts meant that only consensual compositions of municipal
indebtedness were permissible — a problem that Congress much later
identified as the basis for ultimately enacting a federal municipal
bankruptcy law. 140 Until that time, the unanimity requirement for
creditor consent to debt adjustment permitted a small number of
holdouts to condemn any plan to rescue municipalities from debt
overhang by reducing the amount of indebtedness. The states’
withdrawal of previously available assets from creditors’ reach can be
seen as a relatively benign response to the holdout threat. But once
armed with that capacity, states could use the withdrawal threat
strategically, even against creditors who were not engaged in holdout
tactics. Since dissolution threatened to leave creditors with no
recovery at all, their next best alternative was to accept any positive
recovery promised by the state, even if the locality could have afforded

See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(B).
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REG. 351, 353–55 (2010).
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a greater payout than the state was offering.141 In effect, the state’s
option to withdraw assets from the municipality’s sources for debt
payments allowed it to transform the holdout game controlled by
creditors to one of holdup controlled by the state.142 Under current
bankruptcy law, such failure to make a substantial contribution to debt
adjustment would likely preclude a municipality from satisfying the
requirement of confirmation a proposed plan be “in the best interests
of creditors.”143 For example, in Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation
District, the court rejected a plan of adjustment that did not impose
tax-rate increases on district residents, given the absence of a showing
that the district had inadequate taxing power.144 The court concluded
that the failure to impose such increases illicitly placed the entire
burden of adjustment on bondholders.145 The similar lengths to which
the state was willing to play its advantage is evident in the Louisiana
legislation that led to the decision in Wolff. 146 The Louisiana
legislature did not simply impose a tax limitation that made payment
of the bonds implausible, given the assumed priority of using taxes to
pay the “necessary expenses of the city.” 147 It also provided an
alternative for bondholders that the city contended created a sufficient
substitute to avoid any claim of impairment. Creditors could exchange
their bonds for “premium bonds.”148 Notwithstanding the euphemism,
the premium bonds bore no maturity date. 149 Instead, those bonds
were divided into 10,000 series of 100 bonds each, and the time of
payment of each bond within a series was determined by an annual
lottery drawing of the relevant series, followed by a drawing of bonds
within that series to be paid in that year. 150 As summarized by the
Court in Wolff,
under this arrangement, whether a creditor will be paid in one or in
fifty years, will depend upon the turn of a wheel and the drawing of a
lucky number. Of course this plan disregards all the terms upon which
the outstanding bonds of the city — and, among others, those held by

141.
142.
143.
144.
1940).
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See HILLHOUSE, supra note 30, at 172.
See SBRAGIA, supra note 30, at 60.
See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7).
See Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563, 565–66 (9th Cir.
See id.
See Wolff v. City of New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358, 358 (1880).
See id. at 363.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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the relator — were issued, and postpones indefinitely the payment of
both their principal and interest.151

It was against this background that the Court concluded that, although
the state legislature retained the discretion “at any time [to] restrict or
revoke at its pleasure any of the powers of a municipal corporation,
including, among others, that of taxation,” 152 that power “must be
exercised in subordination to the principle which secures the
inviolability of contracts.” 153 But, again, it is plausible that abstract
notions of inviolability were less important to the decision than was
judicial suspicion of state overreaching. The Court did not engage in
any rigorous analysis of what would have constituted a balanced
allocation of losses between residents and creditors. Nor did it believe
it had to. The Court’s ridicule of the state’s proposed procedure
implied that — as in cases where cities had been dissolved — the state
had instituted a mechanism that so drastically disfavored creditors
relative to residents as to render its impropriety obvious. A more
balanced distribution of losses might have generated a different result.
Whether the state was acting malignly or benignly in the dissolution
cases was further complicated by the fact that not all residents within
an indebted municipality had the same motives. Hillhouse and
Monkkonen suggested that small property owners and rural residents
were prone to favor default, while those who had tied their fortunes to
city growth wanted to preserve municipal credit and “favored debt
payment when feasible and renegotiation when not.” 154 But the
difficulty in discerning whether it was the state or the creditors who
were acting strategically did not necessarily mean that the inquiry was
irrelevant. Benign, and thereby permissible, interventions may have
been the appropriate conclusion where the court believed the state was
attempting to maintain municipal functions and pay its “just liabilities”
to the extent possible; a malign intervention constituting an invalid
impairment may have been the appropriate conclusion where the court
believed the state was attempting to hold up creditors in favor of a
recalcitrant but not necessarily impoverished municipality.
More explicit recognition that state intervention placing a
disproportionate cost of adjustment on creditors would affect its
legality would have to wait until the next period of municipal fiscal
distress. The turning point in the analysis occurred in the post-

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 364.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 366.

MONKKONEN, supra note 12, at 89.
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Depression case of Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park155
referenced at the beginning of this Article. Faitoute was not a
dissolution case nor one in which the state withdrew assets from the
indebted municipality. Instead, it involved a plan for the adjustment
or composition of creditors’ claims under what was essentially a state
bankruptcy act. 156 But Justice Frankfurter’s opinion set forth some
principles by which the propriety and validity of states stripping assets
from municipalities can be evaluated. The New Jersey act allowed a
state commission, with the approval of the state supreme court, to
adjust the debts of a distressed municipality with the approval of
creditors representing 85% of the contested indebtedness if approval
of the plan was preceded by findings, among other things, that the
municipality could not afford both to pay the debt and to perform its
public functions.157 The proposed plan extended the time for payment
of outstanding bonds and reduced the interest rate in the interim but
did not compromise the principal amount. Justice Frankfurter seized
on the independent nature of the inquiry into affordability and the
absence of an alternative that would allow creditors a greater recovery
to conclude that the state act did not operate as an impairment. 158
Indeed, he appeared to read a “changed circumstances” exception into
the Contracts Clause, under which the intervention of extreme
circumstances entitled the state to take action that would preserve
municipal functions and taxation but also ensure ultimate payment of
creditors.159 Perhaps most importantly, Justice Frankfurter concluded
that the New Jersey scheme reached a balance that was not exploitative
of creditors because the compromise passed a market test of
impairment; bonds that were selling at 0.69 on the dollar at the time
when the legislation was passed were trading at 0.90 on the dollar at
the time of the Court’s decision.160
Justice Frankfurter’s criteria for permitting state intervention has
conflicting consequences for the dissolution cases. Certainly, he was
attentive to the holdout problem that, unaddressed, would leave
distressed municipalities at the mercy of creditors, and that arguably

155. 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
156. See Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 504.
157. See 1933 N.J. Laws 867; see also 1931 N.J. Laws 835 (detailing the purpose of
statute as dealing with “public emergency”).
158. See Faitoute, 316 U.S. at 515–16.
159. See id. at 511 (“The necessity compelled by unexpected financial conditions to
modify an original arrangement for discharging a city’s debt is implied in every such
obligation for the very reason that thereby the obligation is discharged, not
impaired.”).
160. See id. at 513.
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required some credible threat that failure to compromise would
disadvantage creditors.161 But Justice Frankfurter’s analysis suggested
that states would not be given free rein to hold up creditors. Instead,
some balance between state and creditor interests was the predicate for
approving state intervention. His emphasis on the independent
evaluation of municipal capacity to pay, on the maintenance of the
initial principal amount (notwithstanding the extension of time for
payment), on the practicality of an alternative remedy, and on the need
to consider the best interests of creditors seems directed at the holdup
problem with which states confronted creditors in the nineteenth
century. 162 All those factors suggest that the dissolution cases that
invalidated the withdrawal of municipal assets were a reaction to a
perceived desire by the state and municipality to repudiate debts rather
than to balance municipal fiscal need against creditor expectations. In
those cases, little in the allegedly impairing legislation provided
assurances that debtor municipalities would pay what they could afford
while simultaneously performing essential municipal functions.
At the same time, Justice Frankfurter’s suggestion that market
valuations at the time of litigation could determine the propriety of
state intervention raises greater difficulty for the dissolution cases and
for evaluating state withdrawal of assets generally. The difficulty arises
from the temporal gap between when the allegedly impairing
legislation is litigated and when its effects are realized. Bonds, of
course, are issued for significant periods of time. In Faitoute, the
maturity of bonds that fell into default in payment of interest in 1935
was extended to 1966.163 The original maturity date of the defaulted
bonds is not clear from the report of the case, but, given the bonds were
issued in 1929 and 1930,164 it is reasonable to assume that the original
maturity dates were significantly earlier than the extended period. As
a result, bondholders who were initially willing to take the risk of
municipal solvency for a limited period of time were required to take
that risk for a longer period, and the fact that the plan of adjustment
reduced the nominal interest rate on the new bonds indicates that
creditors were not paid to take that longer-term risk. A conclusion that
the New Jersey legislation did not cause an impairment under those
circumstances because market values of the outstanding bonds had not

161. See id. at 510 (“A policy of every man for himself is destructive of the potential
resources upon which rests the taxing power which in actual fact constitutes the
security for unsecured obligations outstanding against a city.”).
162. See id. at 504.
163. See id. at 507.
164. See id.
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declined makes assumptions about the relevant credit markets that are
not easily sustained. Even if the issuer’s financial condition in the
period shortly after state intervention improved sufficiently to
generate an increase in the bonds’ value at that time, there would be
no reason to conclude that those favorable financial conditions would
continue throughout the extended period during which the bonds
would be outstanding. Stripping municipal revenues once available to
creditors may be superfluous at the time the withdrawal occurs because
sufficient revenues from alternative sources remain available to pay all
debt service. But it is plausible that subsequent decline in the debtor’s
financial position would mean that those same stripped assets become
necessary to pay debt service prior to or at maturity. Unless one
believes that current market prices of municipal securities perfectly
capitalize the risk of all future events, then neither changes nor stability
in market prices will correctly gauge the effects of a current alteration
of municipal revenue-raising capacity on a future ability to pay. The
likelihood of full capitalization in municipal bond markets seems
remote, and even lower than in other securities markets, due to
relatively thin trading in municipal bonds and relatively low-price
transparency.165
The concern that financial conditions could worsen subsequent to
the withdrawal of assets may be less relevant to the dissolution cases,
and perhaps even to Faitoute. In those cases, default had already
occurred, so it is difficult to imagine that the issuers’ financial
conditions could worsen post-withdrawal.
In addition, in the
dissolution cases, the withdrawn assets previously available to creditors
were so substantial a part of what had previously been pledged to
support the debt that there was little chance that remaining assets could
satisfy creditors’ claims in full or were proportionate to the sacrifices
being made by residents.166 In short, those were not cases in which
there was simply a hypothetical differential between the sufficiency of
the original assets and the post-intervention assets to satisfy
bondholders or that residents had contributed in good faith to
settlement. Thus, the true test of whether a current withdrawal of
assets might be improper because of effects in the distant future would

165. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Harris & Michael S. Piwowar, Secondary Trading Costs
in the Municipal Bond Market, 61 J. FINANCE 1361, 1364 (2006).
166. See, e.g., Port of Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); Meriwether v. Garrett,

102 U.S. 472 (1880); Wolff v. City of New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358 (1880); Town of Mt.
Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879); Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535
(1866); Brewis v. City of Duluth, 9 F. 747 (D. Minn. 1881).
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have to await situations in which current withdrawal of assets posed
more conjectural adverse future effects.
III. DIVERSION OF ASSETS TO NEW CREDITORS
A. Asset Stripping Through Bankruptcy Remote Entities

More recent efforts to withdraw assets from an indebted
municipality raise the temporal issue more acutely. In this Section, I
discuss how states have engaged in asset stripping through a form that
does not simply eliminate a source of revenues previously available to
creditors as in the dissolution cases. Rather, state intervention has
taken the form of diverting assets previously available to satisfy one set
of creditors and making those assets available exclusively to a different
set of creditors. In at least some of these cases, the objective of the
diversion was to obtain a new capital infusion to the municipality. Postissuance diversion of assets might initially have insignificant adverse
effects on the municipality’s capacity to pay its debts. But that same
action could, during the period when the debt is outstanding,
significantly reduce the security available to the first group of creditors.
This contemporary form of asset stripping evolved from New York
City’s fiscal crisis in the early to mid-1970s. When the city faced fiscal
paralysis, it was precluded from borrowing in the capital markets by a
combination of balanced budget requirements, lack of access to capital
markets, 167 and state constitutional requirements that permitted
issuance of general obligation debt only if secured by the city’s faith
and credit.168 While the state legislature was sympathetic to the city’s
distress and recognized that the city’s bankruptcy would have ripple
effects across the state,169 the legislature was not of a mind to dissolve
the city or shift municipal boundaries in a manner that would
dispossess creditors of the right to realize on taxes of the city. But the
legislature did the next best thing, perhaps the functional equivalent
from the perspective of pre-existing creditors. The state legislature
created the Municipal Assistance Corporation for the City of New
York (MAC) as an entity of New York State. 170 The state then
removed from New York City the right to collect a sales tax and
enacted an identical state tax, the proceeds of which were allocated to
MAC, and redirected to MAC the proceeds of the previous New York

167.
168.
169.
170.

See BAILEY, supra note 1, at 17–25.
See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
See LACHMAN & POLNER, supra note 1, at 132–36.
N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW § 3033 (McKinney 2003).
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City tax on stock transfers (shades of the replacement of Memphis
taxes with state taxes allocated to the new taxing district?).171 MAC
then used those revenues to secure its own obligations, the proceeds of
which were in turn allocated to New York City’s efforts to provide
services. 172 Importantly to bondholders, MAC was an entity of the
state and the direct recipient of sales and stock transfer tax revenues.
Those funds never passed through the city, as they had prior to the
enacting legislation. MAC, therefore, constituted a bankruptcyremote entity,173 the assets of which presumably could not be reached
by city creditors if New York City itself petitioned for debt adjustment
under federal bankruptcy law.
The diversion of revenues from the city to MAC became a critical
mechanism for solving the liquidity crisis that New York City faced
when it was unable to access credit markets on its own. Creditors were
willing to lend to MAC funds that would ultimately end up in the city
coffers because they felt secure that the pledged revenues were
sufficient to pay MAC obligations and that creditors of the city would
be unable to reach MAC’s assets even if the city entered bankruptcy.
But the fact that those same revenue sources had previously been
part of the city treasury meant that pre-existing city creditors would
not have considered their availability to pay city debts superfluous. At
the time they purchased their bonds, those creditors had received a
pledge of the city’s “faith and credit,” a term of ambiguous meaning
but one that the New York Court of Appeals defined as “a
commitment to pay and a commitment of the city’s revenue generating
powers to produce the funds to pay.” 174 One might have thought,
therefore, that purchasers of bonds secured by such a pledge were
relying on the capacity of the city to have continued access to the
sources of revenue that it possessed at the time of purchase. After all,
tax limitation cases like Von Hoffman had been predicated on the
171. See BAILEY, supra note 1, at 27–28.
172. See id.
173. A bankruptcy-remote entity is one that is related to another borrower but that
is sufficiently independent in form to prevent consolidation of the assets of both parties
in a bankruptcy. Typically, a bankruptcy-remote entity will have a single asset
generating a stream of income sufficient to pay the debts of that entity. In addition, the
bankruptcy-remote entity is typically structured in a manner that makes it difficult for
it to enter bankruptcy. The joint effect is that the bankruptcy of the other borrower
will likely not affect the financial status of the bankruptcy-remote entity. See, e.g.,
David Ramos Muñoz, Bankruptcy Law v Bankruptcy-Remote Structures. Harmony
Out
of
Dissonance?
(Jan.
1,
2014)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2407940
[https://perma.cc/7GNM-UNQB].
174. Flushing Nat’l Bank v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 358 N.E.2d 848, 851 (N.Y. 1976).
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general principle that taxing authority in place at the time bonds were
issued could not be diluted or eliminated while the bonds were
outstanding. 175 Bondholders might reasonably have concluded that
stripping revenue sources from the city and reassigning them, thus
making outstanding bonds less secure than they had previously been,
was indistinguishable from, and no more legitimate under the
Contracts Clause than, stripping the city’s revenue-generating
authority by limiting its taxing capacity, or simply dissolving it or
merging it into another municipality that claimed no obligation to
satisfy the city’s bondholders.
The diversion of municipal revenues initially thought available to
existing creditors has been deployed elsewhere, either to assist a
distressed municipality or simply to raise additional capital. Perhaps
most famously or notoriously, Puerto Rico officials created an
authority, Corporación del Fondo de Interés Apremiante (COFINA),
to receive sales tax revenues, presumably to issue bonds secured by
those revenues, and thereby obtain capital at relatively low interest
rates.176 That capital was then to be used to finance a deficit and reduce
the Commonwealth’s significant debt burden. 177 But the COFINA
experience reveals the very risk that funds once relied on by existing
creditors, then diverted elsewhere could become appropriate if not
necessary to satisfy the former group’s claims. Subsequent to the
issuance of COFINA bonds, the Commonwealth’s deficit grew, not
shrank, and general obligation bondholders who suffered default
ultimately contended that they had both a claim to sales tax revenues
and priority in those revenues over the COFINA bondholders. 178
While that claim was rooted in arguments about the meaning of arcane
terms in the Commonwealth Constitution, its underpinnings are again
reminiscent of the claims in the nineteenth-century cases — general
obligation bondholders have claims to revenue sources subsequently
diverted to other purposes.
More recently, Illinois has created bankruptcy-remote structures in
an effort to assist the City of Chicago, which faces significant financial

175. See Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 554–55 (1866).
176. See Nicole Gelinas, Chicago’s Debt Dereliction, CITY J. (2017),
https://www.city-journal.org/html/chicago’s-debt-dereliction-15497.html
[https://perma.cc/3MFU-BFCV];
see
also
About,
COFINA,
https://cofina.pr.gov/cofina-pr/about/i6094 [https://perma.cc/Z7UZ-593P] (last visited
Mar. 16, 2021).
177. See Gelinas, supra note 176.
178. See In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd., 361 F. Supp. 3d 203, 220–21 (D.P.R.
2019).
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challenges. 179 Initially, Chicago’s school district, which is legally
separate from the city itself, was permitted to issue bonds financed
through a capital improvement tax, a move that allowed the bonds to
be rated well above the junk bond ratings that Chicago city’s own
bonds attracted. 180 The state legislature subsequently permitted
Chicago and other home rule municipalities to create nonprofit
corporations and to assign them state-collected sales tax revenues that
would otherwise have been dedicated to the city.181 Those nonprofit
corporations may then issue debt, secured by the sales tax revenues.182
Because the nonprofit corporation is likely to have lower borrowing
costs than a distressed city like Chicago, it can use the sales tax
revenues to pay debt service and have sufficient funds remaining to
distribute back to the city.183 But the reallocation of sales tax revenues
means that general obligation bondholders of Chicago retain access to
fewer assets to satisfy their claims after the diversion than they did
previously, and the precarious financial situation of the city suggests
that that reduction is, again, not superfluous.
If diversion risks the same adverse effects for creditors as dissolution
strategies, then one might claim that the former strategy is no more
appropriate than the more blatant forms of asset stripping one sees in
the latter. That was essentially the claim that a bondholder made in
the wake of the reallocation of New York City taxes to MAC. In Quirk
v. Municipal Assistance Corp., 184 the New York Court of Appeals
upheld the diversion to MAC of the revenues previously available to
the city on the grounds that “[i]n no way was the city ever committed
to maintain sales tax revenues or stock transfer tax revenues for the
benefit of its bondholders.”185 Bondholders were instead protected by
the state constitution’s faith and credit pledge, payable from local real
estate taxes. Bondholders — even those who were the recipients of the

179. See Gelinas, supra note 176.
180. See Chicago Schools Sell $1 Bln Bonds with Lower Market Penalty, REUTERS
(Nov. 16, 2017, 7:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1N1NM2P5
[https://perma.cc/3GNB-59X8].
181. See Chicago Refunds an Additional $673 Million with Sales Tax Bonds, CIVIC
FED’N (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.civicfed.org/civic-federation/blog/chicago-refundsadditional-673-million-sales-tax-bonds [https://perma.cc/C7UE-DYBK].
182. See Gelinas, supra note 176.
183. See Chicago Refunds an Additional $673 Million with Sales Tax Bonds, supra
note 181; see also Gelinas, supra note 176; Karen Pierog, New Chicago Debt Structure
Wins
Initial
Approval,
REUTERS
(Oct.
5,
2017,
5:16
PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chicago-bonds/new-chicago-debt-structure-winsinitial-approval-idUSKBN1CA2QC [https://perma.cc/XTL4-FKZG].
184. 363 N.E.2d 549 (N.Y. 1977).
185. Id. at 550.
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city’s pledge of its faith and credit — had no “right to insist that any
particular existing taxes be maintained or new ones imposed to
produce those revenues” necessary to meet that pledge. 186 Without
citing Justice Field’s distinction in Meriwether, the court implicitly
acknowledged his assertion that “ordinary taxes” that had not been
explicitly dedicated to debt service on specific bonds were not
necessarily available to satisfy a bondholder’s claim to municipal
revenues.
B. The Temporal Issue — Future Consequences of
Current Asset Stripping

Notwithstanding its approval of the diversion strategy, the court’s
opinion in Quirk was notable for two qualifying remarks. First, the
court concluded with the admonition that “[a] different case would be
presented if, realistically, the city were stripped of all sources of
revenue, other than the real estate tax.”187 In short, the court appeared
to endorse the same kind of Lockean proviso evident in the nineteenthcentury Supreme Court decisions and more explicit in Faitoute —
legislative manipulation of municipal resources was acceptable, as long
as bondholders’ opportunity to receive payment was not diluted too
much in light of the what was necessary to resolve municipal fiscal
distress. Of course, the temporal issue complicates the issue of how
great that opportunity is or must be when a current withdrawal of assets
could implicate the potential for default in years to come. The court of
appeals left that issue unaddressed. Indeed, the court concluded that
the outcome of a case in which all non-real estate revenues were
diverted “would be, at this time, unpredictable.”188 But more than in
Faitoute, where bonds were already in default, the need to determine
the subsequent impact of a diversion on existing holders of long-term
bonds complicates the analysis. Whether or not a particular state
intervention impairs an obligation must be decided when the allegedly
offending legislation is enacted. It cannot be the case that the diversion
of revenues did not constitute an impairment when taxes were
allocated to MAC in 1977 but would be unconstitutional if it turned out
that the sales tax revenues were necessary to pay city creditors in full
when city bonds matured in the distant future. The decision that the
legislation did not create an impairment when enacted essentially binds
the future.

186. Id.
187. Id. at 551.
188. Id.
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As I noted above, a market test will provide little assistance in
determining the future, potentially impairing effects of current
legislation.189 Diversion of sales taxes, for example, might not have
adversely affected the value of New York City bonds at a time when
the very creation of MAC signaled an unwillingness of the state to
allow New York City to fail or for its bonds to go into default. But
predicting the effect of the loss of sales taxes during the entire period
when previously issued New York City bonds would be outstanding is
riddled with uncertainty, and resolving the impairment issue by looking
only at immediate market effects at the time of litigation shifts to
bondholders the risk that such revenues will be necessary to service the
debt in the future.
Second, the court of appeals recognized the similarity of New York’s
plan to the discredited efforts by states to remove the property and
taxes of indebted municipalities from the reach of creditors. The
court’s citation for its assertion about the consequences of the
“different case” in which the city lacked all other revenue sources was
none other than the Supreme Court’s decision in the Port of Mobile
case.190 In each situation, creditors who relied on assets available to
the municipality at the time that credit was extended were
disappointed to discover that those assets had been assigned to a third
party.191 Thus, even in upholding a diversion strategy, the court was
unwilling to distinguish its situation entirely from dissolution cases.
Approval of the diversion strategy in Quirk may have been
underwritten by the state’s interesting, if unique, constitutional
requirement that general obligation bonds must be paid, even if limits
on real estate taxes must be exceeded.192 The court of appeals had
previously relied on that provision to invalidate the state’s attempt to
impose a moratorium on New York City’s note payments. 193 That
mandate could be interpreted as rendering any additional security for
bondholders superfluous and thus rendering the diversion of other
taxes irrelevant. But that is not what the court said, and the use of
diversion by jurisdictions not bound by such security provisions
suggests that a general defense of the strategy requires a broader
justification.194

189.
190.
191.
192.
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See supra notes 159–65 and accompanying text.
See Quirk, 363 N.E.2d at 551.
See Port of Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); Quirk, 363 N.E.2d at 551.
See Quirk, 363 N.E.2d at 551.
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One could find some justification in analogous changes in municipal
financial structures that have not generated constitutional difficulties.
Indeed, subtle forms of municipal asset stripping that reduced revenues
available to pre-existing creditors have been a standard financing
procedure for municipalities for decades, as states and municipalities
issued revenue bonds in an effort to evade state constitutional debt
limits.195 Those limits typically apply to general obligation bonds, that
is, bonds that are secured by the general revenues of the issuer. 196
Debts secured by a “special fund,” on the other hand, have
traditionally fallen outside the scope of constitutional debt subject to
debt limitations. 197 Initially, special funds comprised revenues
generated by operation of the project constructed with bond proceeds,
such as tolls from a financed toll bridge or parking revenues from a
financed parking structure. 198 Excluding funds generated by the
financed project from the category of constitutional debt made sense
insofar as those revenues would not have existed but for the project
financed with debt.199 They did not place the municipal treasury at risk
because bondholders could only look to the revenues generated by
operation of the facility financed with bond proceeds for repayment.200
If the financed project failed, it was the bondholders, not residents of
the issuer, that bore the loss since bondholders could not look to nonproject revenues to cover any shortfall.201 Courts that require some
“nexus” between the project financed with bond proceeds and the
revenue sources dedicated to debt service may be more focused on
preventing an expansion of municipal indebtedness in a manner that
eviscerates constitutional debt limits, but implicitly the adoption of the
narrow special fund theory also ensures that holders of general
obligation bonds have access to a broader array of municipal
revenues.202
Notwithstanding the justifications for excluding special fund or
revenue debt from debt limitations, for several decades, multiple

195. See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE & G. ALLEN BASS,
MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE LAW 230–48 (2d ed. 2013); Robert H. Bowmar, The
Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IOWA L. REV. 863, 873–84 (1957).
196. See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 195, at 239–40.
197. See id. at 230–48; Bowmar, supra note 195, at 873–84.
198. See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 195, at 230–48.
199. See id. at 230–31.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See, e.g., Convention Ctr. Auth. v. Anzai, 890 P.2d 1197, 1205 (Haw. 1995). See
generally Eakin v. State ex rel. Cap. Improvement Bd. of Managers, 474 N.E.2d 62
(Ind. 1985).
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jurisdictions have adopted a broad interpretation of the special fund
doctrine that excluded from debt limits any obligations that were
supported by a specific revenue stream of the issuer, even though those
revenues bore no relationship to the project funded with bond
proceeds.203 Parking meter revenues, for example, might have been
available to pay holders of general obligation bonds, but might then be
diverted to pay bonds of a convention center authority, even if the
parking meters were located at a distance from the convention center.
That interpretation prevailed even though the pledged revenues may
otherwise have been available to pay pre-existing general obligation
bondholders. Courts have justified the expansion of the doctrine on
various grounds, but largely on the theory that debt limitations apply
to obligations secured by ad valorem property taxes.204
Although the broad special fund doctrine has been attacked as a
subterfuge on state constitutional debt limits,205 I am not aware of any
successful claim that, by removing a source of revenue that may
otherwise have been available to holders of general obligation bonds
issued prior to the diversion of revenues to revenue bonds, the doctrine
also violates the Contracts Clause. At most, courts have expressed
concern that balkanization of different revenue sources would
effectively undermine any constraint on municipal borrowing.206 But
that balkanization tends to occur when municipalities that require a
means of evading a debt limitation remain in relatively good fiscal
health, as evidenced by the fact that they have access to the credit
markets. The broad special fund doctrine effectively allows localities
to expand their debt-incurring capacity to take advantage of that access
or avoid an electoral vote that would be triggered if general obligation
bonds, and the accompanying property taxes, were used to finance the
same project. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld an extreme
version of the concept when it permitted bonds to finance construction
and repair public buildings to be secured by a tax levy on all taxable
property in the state in an amount sufficient to pay debt service, but
excluded those bonds from the constitutional debt limit on the grounds

203. See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 195, at 244.
204. See generally Long v. Napolitano, 53 P.3d 172 (Ariz. 2002).
205. See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 195, at 147; Bowmar, supra note 195; C.
Robert Morris, Jr., Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The
Costly Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958); Nadav Shoked,
Debt Limits’ End, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1239 (2017). Of course, if debt limitations do not
realistically permit municipalities to secure necessary capital, then mechanisms for
circumventing them may be necessary to ensure appropriate capital funding. See
Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1241, 1256–64 (2009).
206. See, e.g., Naftalin v. King, 90 N.W.2d 185, 190 n.6 (Minn. 1958).
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that — although the bonds were secured by the type of ad valorem
property taxes associated with general obligations that are the
hallmark of “constitutional” debt — the legislative carve out essentially
created a special fund that was sufficiently analogous to a revenue
bond.207
Widespread adoption of the special fund doctrine suggests that it
would not be vulnerable to invalidation under the Contracts Clause,
even if it were reconceptualized as a means of asset stripping rather
than a mechanism for circumventing debt limits. The absence of any
such challenge to the practice notwithstanding the enlargement of the
special fund doctrines suggests that bondholders do not consider
themselves protected against such a strategy. Courts that have
committed to the doctrine may be motivated by a sense that debt limits
themselves are either arbitrary or antiquated. 208 Failure to validate
even radical strategies for their circumvention could prevent
municipalities from financing essential infrastructure. It is implausible
that courts would disrupt municipal credit markets at this stage by
finding that debts supported by revenues with an insufficient nexus to
the financed project impaired the obligations of general obligation
bondholders. But to the extent that acceptance of the broad special
fund doctrine is predicated on the necessity for municipalities to access
credit markets, it may have similar implications when asset stripping
takes other forms or similarly serves municipal necessity, even at the
risk of diluting the security of pre-existing creditors.
One might then return to Justice Frankfurter’s use of a market test209
to define the permissible scope of asset stripping. If market prices of
existing municipal securities remain stable after the issuer adopts a
diversion strategy or issues additional bonds secured by a special fund,
one might claim that serves as relatively conclusive evidence that the
diversion failed to impair the pre-existing obligation. Nevertheless,
courts have not made significant use of the market test. The court in
Quirk, for example, made no inquiry into the effect of the reallocation
of sales tax and stock transfer tax revenues on city bonds.210 The most
significant post-Faitoute use of the market test appears in United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey 211 and its controversial application
there. The Court held that the repeal of a statutory covenant that the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey would not subsidize mass
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See generally id.
See AMDURSKY ET AL., supra note 195, at 309–13.
See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
See Quirk v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 363 N.E.2d 549 (N.Y. 1977).
431 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1977).
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transit facilities constituted an unconstitutional impairment. 212 As
evidence of an impairment, bondholders contended that the postrepeal market for the bonds had become thin, while the issuer
maintained that the market had recovered and the bonds retained their
“A” rating.213 The majority concluded that evidence concerning the
market effects of the repeal was too ambiguous to assist in the
determination of an impairment. 214 Justice Harry Blackmun found
additional ambiguity in the possibility that non-repeal factors could
have affected market value, while other conditions, notably the very
litigation about the repeal’s validity, might mean that not all relevant
effects had yet been factored into market prices.215 Justice William J.
Brennan’s dissent in United States Trust Co. observed that the
ambiguity over market effects revealed an inability of bondholders to
prove an adverse effect of the repeal and reiterated that any market
effect had involved only a short-term reduction in value.216
Neither side in the United States Trust Co. debate, however,
addressed the temporal issue that I have suggested is inherent in
assessing potential impairments. Justice Blackmun’s observation that
not all effects may be reflected in market prices at the time of litigation
must be correct, but not only for the reasons that he suggested, that is,
the litigation’s own effect on market value. 217 Rather, the primary
problem with using the market test to evaluate a current modification
of the issuer’s revenue-raising capacity lies in the possibility of an event
that dramatically increases default risk but is sufficiently remote at the
time of litigation as not to be factored into current market prices. That
is not to say that the potential for such a risk means that any
modification of revenue raising capacity creates an unconstitutional
impairment. That conclusion would return us to the pre-Depression
case law that read the Contracts Clause as an absolute and would

212. See id. at 32.
213. See id. at 18–19.
214. See id. at 19.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 42–43 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A subsequent case from the State of
Washington echoed Justice Blackmun’s concern about the endogenous effects of
litigation. In Pierce County v. State, the Washington Supreme Court invalidated as an
unconstitutional impairment of contract an initiative that withdrew an issuer’s ability
to levy and collect a motor vehicle excise tax, the proceeds of which had been pledged
as security for bonds issued to finance a transportation system. See Pierce County v.
State, 148 P.3d 1002, 1006–07 (Wash. 2002). But when the issuer argued that continued
market for the bonds after enactment of the tax repeal revealed the absence of any
impairment, the court responded that market price stability may simply have revealed
an expectation that the court would invalidate the law. See id. at 1013–14.
217. See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 19.
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preclude adjustments to outstanding obligations when they are most
needed.218 But it does suggest that the market test is somewhat of a
one-way ratchet for purposes of the impairment test. If the state’s
diversion of municipal revenues does cause an immediate and
substantial decline in the affected bonds’ market value, an impairment
seems obvious. On the other hand, the absence of a market value
decline at the time of the state’s intervention does not necessarily
indicate the absence of an impairment since future events,
unanticipated at the time of the litigation or otherwise not fully
capitalized into current market prices, may reveal that the reduced
security was necessary to make bondholders whole after all.
Perhaps the decision that came closest to wrestling with the temporal
issue was the opinion of the California Supreme Court when it
evaluated the effects of California’s sweeping restrictions on property
taxation.219 The initiative that promulgated those restrictions excluded
from the new tax limitation any indebtedness previously approved by
the voters. 220 That exclusion appears to have been a bow towards
nineteenth-century Supreme Court cases such as Von Hoffman. But
the exclusion did not apply to bonds that had been issued without the
requirement of a bond election, such as redevelopment bonds secured
by anticipated property tax increments attributable to
redevelopment.221 The California Supreme Court acknowledged that
the new restrictions would reduce those tax increments to the
detriment of bondholders.222 Nevertheless, the court concluded that
no impairment of the bondholders was implicated.223 The court relied
on the peculiar reasoning that nothing in the new law “requires local
agencies to default either in meeting their preexisting contracts or in
liquidating their outstanding bonds,” and that no default had yet
occurred. 224 Of course, the Contracts Clause prohibition on the
“impairment” of the obligation of contract assumes that current
alterations of the initial bond contract may have future consequences
rather than cause immediate default. Nonpayment of an obligation
may constitute a breach of the underlying contract, but it does not
constitute an impairment. Rather, an impairment arises when the state

218. See, e.g., Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. 535, 553 (1866).
219. See Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
583 P.2d 1281 (Cal. 1978).
220. See id. at 1284.
221. See id. at 1295–96.
222. See id. at 1296.
223. See id.
224. Id.
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takes an action today that reduces the likelihood that the obligor will
be able to perform in the future in a manner consistent with the parties’
original understanding. 225 Thus, the court’s contention, that in the
absence of default any claim of a constitutional violation was
premature, 226 seems inconsistent with underlying Contracts Clause
principles.
As a more plausible response to the claim of impairment, the court
observed that the state created a fund to provide loan funds to local
agencies at risk of defaulting on bonds, though it remained unclear,
even to the court, how such loans would be structured or repaid.227 If
the court was concluding that the substitution of one form of security
for another would be sufficient to ward off an impairment, it relied on
established principles, but only if the new security was the equivalent
of the old.228 Certainly, the court’s ultimate determination that default
was not an “[i]nevitable consequence” of the tax limitation sets an
idiosyncratically high bar for an impairment.229
But for purposes of the temporal issue, the California court’s more
interesting analysis involved its recognition that withdrawal of assets
today may have implications for creditors only in the distant future.230
Those who claimed an impairment alleged that the new tax limits
created an immediate “depreciation” of the security relied upon by the
obligees.231 The court did not deny that such an effect had occurred.
Rather, it concluded that Contracts Clause jurisprudence permitted
post-obligation modification of statutes affecting creditors as long as
those changes did not affect an express term of the agreement or have
a substantial effect on the repayment of debts.232 In short, the court
maintained, existing case law did not provide “that an unlawful
impairment occurs immediately upon imposition of the tax restriction,
without regard to its ultimate effect upon the repayment of preexisting
debts.”233 But, again, therein lies the difficulty. When dealing with
obligations that may be outstanding for several decades after the state
intervention, one cannot easily forecast the “ultimate effect” on the
225. See, e.g., Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233, 237 (1920).
226. See Amador Valley, 583 P.2d at 1297.
227. See id.
228. See e.g., W.A. Foote Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Kelley, 211 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1973);
In re Op. of the Justs., 246 A.2d 90 (Del. 1968); Beaumont v. Faubus, 394 S.W.2d 478
(Ark. 1965); Jacksonville Port Auth. v. State, 161 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1964).
229. Amador Valley, 583 P.2d at 1297 (emphasis added).
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. Id.
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ability to pay creditors. For example, holders of Puerto Rico’s general
obligation bonds did not challenge the diversion of sales taxes to secure
COFINA bonds when the enabling legislation was enacted in 2006, but
those same bondholders strenuously objected when it developed a
decade later that the Commonwealth had insufficient funds to pay its
full indebtedness.234 The consequence is that current market values
are at best a rough proxy that assume the risk of future events is fully
capitalized. Perhaps for that reason, other courts have simply ignored
the temporal issue.235
That leaves us, however, with the following puzzle: if the diversion
strategy has potential consequences for creditors similar to those that
generated dissolution, then can the legal implications of the diversion
cases be distinguished from those of the dissolution cases? Aurelia
Chaudhury, Adam J. Levitin, and David Schleicher suggested that at
least some of the nineteenth-century dissolution cases are of limited
precedential value, in part because their reasonings are opaque.236 But
the cases may be sufficiently similar in their effects on creditors that it
would be undesirable to declare the earlier ones inapplicable, and
sufficiently distinguishable that they teach us some useful lessons about
municipal finance. They are certainly similar insofar as they reveal the
utility of an asset stripping strategy by a state intent on assisting its
financially imperiled municipalities from the reach of creditors.
Removing the City of Mobile’s revenue-raising capacity was no less of
an effort to assist its residents than shifting the New York City sales tax
from city creditors to MAC creditors.
There is, of course, a difference in the immediacy of the impact on
creditors. In the dissolution cases, default had already occurred or was

234. In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd., 361 F. Supp. 3d 203, 220–21 (D.P.R. 2019).
235. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rendered an advisory opinion
concerning the effect of a similar proposed constitutional tax limitation on outstanding
bonds of the Commonwealth. See In re Op. of the Justs., 9 N.E.2d 189 (Mass. 1937).
That proposal contained no exception for outstanding bonds issued when the
Commonwealth presumably possessed unlimited taxing power to pay debt service. See
id. The court, citing the nineteenth-century dissolution cases, concluded that “any law
which withdraws or limits the taxing power, and leaves no adequate means for the
payment of the bonds, is forbidden.” Id. at 191 (quoting Port of Mobile v. Watson, 116
U.S. 289, 305 (1886)). But the court found that the tax limitation did not have the
unconstitutional effect for the intriguing reason that creditors of Massachusetts
municipalities retained an ancient remedy of levying an execution issued on a judgment
in their favor on the real estate of any person within such city or town. See id. While
proceeding against the property of multiple residents of the indebted municipality
might not be “so convenient as collection from a town or city treasurer,” the availability
of the remedy negated the argument that the tax limitation caused an impairment. Id.
236. See Chaudhury et al., supra note 101, at 525 n.272.
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imminent, so there was no doubt that withdrawing assets would
interfere with creditors’ ability to satisfy judgments obtained against
issuers.237 In the diversion cases, actual losses would only occur in the
future and might be purely hypothetical throughout the period when
affected bonds remained outstanding.238 The court in Quirk implied
that diversion of taxes did not necessarily entail default. 239 It was
plausible that alternative revenue sources, especially the
constitutionally required tax on real estate, would be sufficient to pay
debts. 240 That apparent difference dissipates somewhat when one
recognizes the difficulty of forecasting the long-term effects of current
changes in bondholder security. Still, there is a matter of degree in the
temporal effects of the alleged impairment, and in legal doctrines,
matters of degree may matter.241
Nevertheless, I am tempted to conclude that the most important
distinction between the cases lies in the motive for adopting the
dissolution or diversion strategy, largely as revealed by the state’s
demand that the debtor minimize the loss to creditors. Again, some
kind of balancing or, in modern bankruptcy terms, “good faith”
negotiation seems necessary before judicial validation of the asset
stripping strategy. Recall that one way to explain the dissolution cases
is to view them as a reaction to states that had been insufficiently
attentive to creditors’ interests and overly protective of debtor
municipalities.242 Return, for example, to Monkkonen’s claim that the
widespread defaults of the nineteenth-century railroad bond era often
reflected political resistance to payment of debts rather than fiscal
incapacity, or that residents were motivated by a failure to receive the
benefits for which they thought they, or their officials, had
bargained.243 The dissolution cases perhaps reveal an unwillingness by
courts, at least federal courts, to deny residents an escape route when
bonds were validly issued but default was triggered by regret due to the
failure of the financed project. Even if these debts were legally valid,
that is, they had been issued for a permissible purpose and the issuer
had jumped through the necessary prerequisites to issuance, the fact

237. See supra Section II.A.
238. See supra Section III.A.
239. See Quirk v. Mun. Assistance Corp., 363 N.E.2d 549, 646–47 (N.Y. 1977).
240. See id. at 647.
241. See Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 891 (N.Y. 1921) (“The same
omission may take on one aspect or another according to its setting. . . . The question
is one of degree.”).
242. See supra notes 155–65 and accompanying text.
243. See MONKKONEN, supra note 12, at 69.
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remained that residents felt both overly burdened and duped. 244
Monkkonen suggested that when railroads actually operated, the
residents did not default, notwithstanding plausible arguments that the
underlying debts had been illegally incurred. 245 The negative
implication for Monkkonen is that debt repudiation was politically
motivated and was used to shift risks of debts that had been validly, if
imprudently, incurred from residents to bondholders. Fairman’s rich
history of the period suggests a similar battle in which nonpayment was
underscored by political resistance even to compromise with
bondholders that might have required the debtor to bear some of the
risk of project failure.246
The motivation behind MAC’s creation and diversion of New York
City revenues to MAC bonds appeared quite different. The New York
legislature, and more recently Illinois, were creating new entities, albeit
bankruptcy-remote ones, to obtain additional capital for a municipality
otherwise unable to access credit markets.247 Rather than dissolve the
city, the New York legislature was arguably diverting revenue to
ensure the city’s survival by addressing a liquidity crisis. In the
dissolution cases, in short, the primary objective was to reduce creditor
security or to hold up creditors in an effort to avoid improvidently
incurred obligations.248 In the contemporary diversion cases, reducing
creditor security was a necessary but secondary by-product of an effort
to create a new set of creditors willing to invest capital if they could
rely on specific security other than the city’s general credit.249 In this
sense, the diversion strategy is akin to the special fund cases, in which
new capital essential to municipal economic development can only be
obtained by circumventing debt limitations. Courts faced with
governments in fiscal distress or constraints on growth have similarly
winked at constitutional requirements by concluding that the use of
intermediaries such as MAC did not undermine obligations for debtors
to borrow only on a general obligation basis,250 or that the inclusion of
a clause allowing the legislature to refuse to appropriate funds for debt
service removed an obligation from the category of debt.251

244. See supra Section II.A.
245. See MONKKONEN, supra note 12, at 69.
246. See FAIRMAN, supra note 12, at 974–84.
247. See Gelinas, supra note 176, at 134.
248. See supra Section II.A.
249. See supra Section III.A.
250. See e.g., Loc. Gov’t Assistance Corp. v. Sales Tax Asset Receivable Corp., 813
N.E.2d 587 (N.Y. 2004); Wein v. City of New York, 331 N.E.2d 514 (N.Y. 1975).
251. See Schowalter v. State, 822 N.W.2d 292, 302–03 (Minn. 2012).
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Indeed, the stated objective in New York was to stave off default
and bankruptcy that, if plausible, would likely have required
bondholders to settle for significantly less than the face value of their
bonds.252 As in Faitoute, the practical implications of the strategy may
be different from the apparent efforts in the dissolution cases to
repudiate debts fully or to force a settlement on bondholders who may
have believed that they had already paid to offload the risk of project
failure that had materialized.
Of course, dissolution strategies similarly improve the municipal
balance sheet by offloading debt. There is an economic equivalence
between a distressed municipality that is able to save a dollar of debt
service by denying creditors access to that dollar and a municipality
that is able to attract an additional dollar of revenue by securitizing
revenues diverted from what was previously available to creditors. In
either case, the distressed municipality has a dollar more than it
previously did and has the potential to reduce debt overhang. But if
we are concerned with ensuring that distressed localities are able to
fund the services for which they were created and attract additional
investment — rather than to pay for previously incurred debts, which
is likely to deter investment — there may be a distinction between the
two strategies.253 The diversion strategy is adopted for the very specific
purpose of receiving capital infusions that can be used to provide
services rather than to pay legacy costs and thus allow the municipality
to regain its financial footing. Diversion of prior city revenues in cases
like MAC thereby addressed a liquidity crisis through a strategy which,
if successful, would plausibly increase the probability of recoveries for
existing creditors. Nothing in the dissolution cases suggests that local
savings from debt reduction would be used to attract new capital, and
certainly they reveal no expectation that dissolution would make
creditors better off. Indeed, the repudiation of debt suggests both that
the municipalities themselves had adopted an anti-debt position254 and
that, even if they had not, repudiation would make future creditors
wary of extending credit to them. Repudiation may have been
appropriate to avoid an existential threat to the defaulting
municipalities. But there was no hint, as there has been in the diversion

252. I say “if plausible” because the version of the Bankruptcy Code that dealt with
municipal bankruptcy at the time was largely impractical for large cities, insofar as it
required the consent of a higher percentage of creditors than could have been
obtained. See Gillette & Skeel, Jr., supra note 26, at 1176–82.
253. See Buccola & Buccola, supra note 39 (manuscript at 11–12); McConnell &
Picker, supra note 25, at 460.
254. See FAIRMAN, supra note 12, at 947–66.
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cases, that state intervention was part of an overall strategy to foster
municipal economic growth and thus ensure delivery of the local public
goods and services that the municipality was created to provide.
CONCLUSION

States that seek to resolve fiscal distress within their political
subdivisions face both political and economic pressures to balance
residents’ and creditors’ interests. History reveals that those pressures
may lead the state to engage in strategies that significantly favor one
set of interests over the other. Constitutional constraints, and the
Contracts Clause in particular, create a bulwark against favoritism that
significantly exploits creditors. But the scope of those constraints must
be attentive to the reasons why a state has selected one strategy for
dealing with municipal fiscal distress over another. Strategies that
deprive creditors of access to assets previously thought pledged but
that provide distressed cities with needed capital receive more
deference than strategies that allow debtors to avoid the consequences
of a default that has already occurred. The former suggests a concerted
effort to avoid debt overhang and ensure the economic development
necessary for a city to finance the services it was created to provide.
The latter does not.
Strategies that entail significant debtor
contributions to relieving fiscal distress receive more deference than
strategies that impose a holdup “compromise” on creditors. The
former suggests a desire to balance the interests of both residents and
creditors.
The latter does not.
Courts may have difficulty
distinguishing among these situations. In particular, they will
inevitably have difficulty predicting the long-term consequences of
current efforts to divert revenues from the grasp of creditors. At the
very least, however, history suggests that judicial reactions to stateapproved asset stripping strategies that plausibly have similar effects
on creditors depend on the court’s conception of what the state was
attempting to accomplish more than on a desire to achieve doctrinal
consistency.

